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COMPETING TEACHER ASSOCIATIONS AND SCHOOL
MAILBOXES: A RIGHT OF EQUAL ACCESS
Perry Local Educators' Association v. Hohit
652 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1981),
rev'd, 51 U.S.L.W. 4165 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1983)
From the first amendment's guarantee that "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech,"' two underlying guaran-
tees have emerged by judicial interpretation. The first is that persons
have a right of access to public property, at least to that property that
has traditionally been used for public discourse, in order to exercise
their right of freedom of expression. 2 Freedom of speech, without such
access, would be a right reserved only for those who can afford other
methods of communicating with their government and fellow citizens.
3
Public places are usually regarded as "public forums"' 4 and speech ac-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
2. Historically the first amendment right of access to public property was limited to property
which "traditionally" served as a place for public discourse and debate: streets and parks. That
view grew from a concurring opinion by Justice Roberts in Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496. 515
(1939):
Wherever the title of street and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.
Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
The Court has on occasion broadened the scope of the first amendment right of access to include
nontraditional forums. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1974)
(public theater); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (plurality opinion) (public library). See
generally Stone, Fora Americana." Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 233 [hereinafter
referred to as Fora Americana].
3. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 50-51 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). InAdderley,
college students demonstrated on the driveway of a county jail to protest the arrest of fellow
students the day before, and for alleged racial segregation at the jail and elsewhere. After being
warned that they were trespassing in violation of state law, the students were arrested when they
refused to leave. In upholding the students' convictions, the Court's majority held that the stu-
dents did not have a first amendment right of access to the jail's driveway. Justice Douglas, in
dissent, argued that a first amendment right of access was needed to afford those who do not have
access to other methods of communication a means of petitioning their government:
Conventional methods of petitioning may be, and often have been, shut off to large
groups of our citizens. Legislators may turn deaf ears; formal complaints may be routed
endlessly through a bureaucratic maze; courts may let the wheels of justice grind very
slowly. Those who do not control television and radio, those who cannot afford to ad-
vertise in newspapers or circulate elaborate pamphlets may have only a more limited
type of access to public officials. Their methods should not be condemned as tactics of
obstruction and harassment as long as the assembly and petition are peaceable. ...
See also Fora Americana, supra note 2, at 245.
4. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). See generally Cass, First Amend-
ment Access to Gorernment Facilities, 65 VA. L. REV. 1287 (1979); Kalven, The Concept of the
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cess to such forums can only be curbed by reasonable "time, place and
manner" regulations. 5 The second guarantee is that the first amend-
ment prohibits the government from regulating speech on the basis of
the content of the speaker's message. 6 The United States Supreme
Court has viewed content-based regulations as a form of censorship,
directly conflicting with the guarantee of freedom of speech.7
Although the principle that there is a general first amendment
right of access to public places and the prohibition against content-
based speech regulations are not dependent on each other for their ap-
plication, 8 both principles have sometimes been at issue in a particular
case. Thus, when the government has attempted to exclude persons
from public property on the basis of speech content, the Court has fre-
quently held that the restrictions are unconstitutional. 9
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court and the lower courts have not
been entirely consistent.' 0 This inconsistency has been especially ap-
parent when the courts have been confronted with claims of speech
access to public places that do not resemble the streets and parks
deemed in Hague v. C1.0. 1 tto have "immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public."' 2 When the nature of the public place in
question presents special problems to the government if broad first
amendment access is granted, sometimes courts have found the com-
peting governmental interests sufficient to outweigh the general prohi-
bition against content-based exclusions from public places. The result
has been that the courts have viewed the particular property as not fall-
Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. I [hereinafter referred to as Kalven]; Note,
The Public Forum: Minimum Access, Equal Access, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV.
117 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as The Public Forum].
5. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 121 (1972); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mos-
Icy, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972).
6. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin
Employment Rel. Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205
(1975); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
7. See id See also Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of
Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81, 82 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as Stone].
8. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 455 (1975), where the Court struck
down a content-based restriction unrelated to speech access. In Erznoznik, the Court held that an
ordinance that prohibited drive-in movie theaters from displaying any movie containing nudity if
visible from the street was an unconstitutional content-based speech regulation. See Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), where the exclusion from the forum was unrelated to content, but
rather based on a state trespass statute. See generally Stone, supra note 7, at 95.
9. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin
Employment Rel. Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972).
10. See Stone, supra note 7, at 83; The Public Forum, supra note 4, at 118.
11. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
12. Id. at 515.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ing within the types of property that constitute a public forum, thus
allowing the government to either exclude the public from the place
entirely,' 3 or, in some cases, to selectively exclude some persons on
seemingly content-based criteria.'
4
In the recent case of Perry Local Educators'Association v. Hoht,
1 5
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed
the question of whether a teacher association had a constitutional right
of access to a public school district's inter-school mail system to dis-
tribute literature related to association activities. In Hohit, a collective
bargaining agreement between the Perry Education Association,'
6
which represented a majority of the district's teachers, and the school
board gave the PEA the exclusive right to use the school district's inter-
school mail system. The Perry Local Educators' Association,' 7 a rival
labor group, filed suit against the PEA and the school board members,
claiming that the exclusive access provision violated its members' first
amendment right of freedom of speech and the fourteenth amend-
ment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. ' 8
13. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (county jail grounds).
14. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), where the Court upheld a regulation that
prohibited, in part, partisan political speeches at a military base. See also Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion). The plurality in Lehman upheld a city
ordinance that prohibited political, but not commercial, advertising on city buses. Justice Black-
mun, writing for the plurality, noted that the "nature" of the place often is an important consider-
ation in determining whether a right of speech access exists:
Although American constitutional jurisprudence, in light of the First Amendment, has
been jealous to preserve access to public places for purposes of free speech, the nature of
the forum and the conflicting interests involved have remained important in determining
the degree of protection afforded by the Amendment to the speech in question.
Id. at 302-03. See also Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282-83 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
15. 652 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 51 U.S.L.W. 4165 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1983).
16. Hereinafter referred to as PEA.
17. Hereinafter referred to as PLEA.
18. Although the facts in Hohli involved a labor confrontation, the case differs from a labor
dispute in the private sector in two respects. First, state and local governmental bodies, like public
school boards, are exempted from the scrutiny of the National Labor Relations Act, which regu-
lates some private sector labor relations. The Act, which is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1976), provides in relevant part:
The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or
indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government
corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision
thereof....
29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976).
Second, unlike private employers, who are not governed by the Constitution's Bill of Rights,
governmental bodies cannot withhold rights embodied in the Constitution from their employees.
See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), where the Court held that a school
board's dismissal of a teacher who wrote a letter to the local newspaper criticizing the school
board, violated the teacher's first amendment right of freedom of expression. Although an argu-
ment has been made that government, in its role as an employer, should have less of a responsibil-
ity in guaranteeing constitutional rights to its employees, that argument has now been generally
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Thus, the Hohit court was faced with a dilemma. If the court up-
held the exclusive access provision it would in effect sanction a content-
based speech restriction, which presumably violates the first amend-
ment. The provision was content-based because it had the effect of
favoring the PEA's views on labor issues over the views of the PLEA by
restricting access to the mail system so that only the PEA could dissem-
inate information about labor issues to teachers. However, if the court
found that the mail system was a "public forum," the school district
would have to open the system to the general public, placing a substan-
tial burden on a system that was only designed for communication be-
tween school personnel.
Prior to Hohlt two federal circuit courts had addressed the consti-
tutionality of collective bargaining agreements that granted exclusive
access to public school districts' inter-school mail systems to majority
teacher associations. In Memphis American Federation of Teachers v.
Board of Education, 19 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that the exclusive access provision did not implicate the
first amendment rights of the minority teacher association. 20 The Sixth
Circuit also concluded that there was no violation of the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment because the provision was ra-
tionally related 2' to the school district's legitimate interest in preserving
labor peace.22 In Connecticut State Federation of Teachers v. Board of
Education Members,23 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit determined that the exclusive access provision did not vio-
late the first amendment because the impairment on the minority
associations' speech interests was "de minimis.' ' 24 Because the Second
Circuit interpreted an applicable state law in a way that made it unnec-
rejected by the courts. See Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Comm'n,
429 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976). See generally Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in Collective Bar-
gaining, 64 MINN. L. REV. 183, 245 (1980); Note, The Validity of Exclusive Privileges in the Public
Employment Sector, 49 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1064, 1070 (1974).
19. 534 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1976).
20. Id. at 702.
21. The terna "rationally related" refers to the rational basis test, one of two tests used by the
courts to review equal protection claims. If the court finds that the regulation does not impinge on
a fundamental right, like speech, or is not otherwise suspect, it will apply the rational basis test.
Under this test, the governmental regulation is almost always upheld. See, e.g., McDonald v.
Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969). If the court finds that a discriminatory regulation
has impaired a fundamental right, or is otherwise suspect, the court will apply "strict scrutiny."
Under this test, the governmental regulation usually does not survive constitutional attack. See,
e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). See notes 39-63 and accompanying
text infra.
22. 534 F.2d at 703.
23. 538 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1976).
24. Id. at 481.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
essary to address the equal protection issue, the court abstained from
deciding that claim.
25
Contrary to the decisions of the Sixth and Second Circuits, the
Hoht court held that the exclusive access provision violated the first
amendment rights of the minority association. The Hohlt court also
held that the provision violated the equal protection clause. Unlike the
other federal circuit courts, the Seventh Circuit strictly scrutinized 26 the
school board's justifications for the access provision, instead of using
the easily met rational basis test. 27 In determining that the exclusive
access provision was unconstitutional, the Seventh Circuit distin-
guished between content-based restrictions that deny first amendment
access to public facilities in a neutral manner and policies that deny
access to public facilities on the basis of a speaker's viewpoint. 28 The
Hohit court stated that the access provision did not evenhandedly re-
move the entire subject of labor relations from being discussed by both
associations via the forum, but discriminated between associations on
the basis of their viewpoint on the subject. 29 The court stated that the
latter restriction was a more onerous form of censorship and held that
if one association was allowed access to the system, the school board
was constitutionally obligated to provide speech access to the compet-
ing association.
30
Thus, instead of recognizing a general first amendment right of
access to the mail system, the Hohlt court saw the problem as one of
equal access. Although the Hohit court recognized that the access pro-
vision was content-based, the purpose of this case comment will be to
show that the court failed to prevent the possibility that school boards,
under the Hohlt analysis, can close mail systems to all discussion re-
lated to labor concerns, thus engaging in content-based regulation and
eroding the general principle of first amendment access.
The constitutionality of a speech-access regulation depends sub-
stantially on the degree of scrutiny that the courts use to review the
government's justifications for the regulation. As a result, it is impor-
25. Id. at 483-84.
26. See note 19 supra.
27. 652 F.2d at 1294-96.
28. Id. The Seventh Circuit distinguished between subject-matter speech regulation and
viewpoint-based speech regulation. In the former, the government removes an entire subject from
being discussed in the forum. In the latter, the government allows the subject to be discussed, but
only from certain viewpoints. Both regulations are forms of content-based speech regulation.
This comment, when referring to content-based speech regulation, is meant to include both sub-
ject-matter and viewpoint-based speech regulation. See generally Stone, supra note 7.
29. 652 F.2d at 1294-96.
30. Id.
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tant to understand the different standards of review, or scrutiny, before
considering questions of constitutionality. Accordingly, this case com-
ment will begin by briefly describing the degrees of scrutiny that the
United States Supreme Court uses when it addresses speech-access
claims under the first amendment and the equal protection clause. Sec-
ondly, this comment will provide an overview of cases which illustrate
factual situations where the courts have applied the different standards
of review. Then, it will address the problem of how the "nature" of a
particular place can create a tension between first amendment rights
and important governmental interests associated with the facility.
Next, this case comment will analyze the facts and rationale of the
Hohlt court. It will suggest that the inter-school mail system in Hohlt
was a limited public forum. Last, this comment will recommend a way
to grant access to both associations which will prevent the possibility
that school boards will engage in content-based censorship and yet
avoid overburdening a system that was not designed to be used by the
general public.
SPEECH ACCESS To PUBLIC PLACES
If a governmental regulation grants speech access to one group of
citizens, but denies access to another group, the first amendment or the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment may be raised to
attack the governmental regulation. 3' The first amendment may be
raised because it guarantees that an individual's freedom of speech will
not be abridged by the government. 32 The equal protection clause may
be raised because the regulation discriminates between two groups, vio-
lating the fourteenth amendment's proscription against creating dis-
criminatory classifications. 33
As a matter of practicality, the Supreme Court has rarely ad-
dressed the equal protection claim when speech access issues are raised
because freedom of speech is specifically protected by the first amend-
ment.34 The first amendment guarantees have been incorporated
31. See generally Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 20 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as Karst]; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 675-76 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as NOWAK].
32. See, e.g., Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Comm'n, 429 U.S.
167 (1976) (holding that a commission order barring non-union teachers from addressing the
school board during a public meeting on collective bargaining issues violated the first
amendment).
33. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting
picketing in residential neighborhoods, except peaceful labor picketing, violated the equal protec-
tion clause).
34. See NOWAK, supra note 31, at 676.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
through judicial interpretation into the fourteenth amendment, which
acts as a limitation on state and lesser governmental bodies. 35 None-
theless, the Court has on occasion applied an equal protection analysis
as a basis for decision.36 Some writers have suggested that the Court
has employed the equal protection analysis in these cases to avoid the
more difficult question of whether a broad-based first amendment right
of access should be granted. 37 The Court also has applied so-called
"ancillary doctrines"-for example, finding that the access regulation is
unconstitutionally overbroad or vague-in an attempt to avoid the first
amendment access issue. 38
The Standards of Review- The First Amendment and
Equal Protection Clause
Whether a governmental policy regulating speech access to public
property is constitutional is largely determined by the degree of scru-
tiny the courts decide is necessary in a given case to review the govern-
ment's justifications for the regulation. 39 Presuming that the speech in
question does not fall within certain well-defined categories of speech
that are not afforded first amendment protection, such as obscenity,
40
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Constitutional guarantees like the first amendment are applicable to state and local governments,
like public school boards, through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g.,
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See generally NOWAK, supra note 31, at 379.
36. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972).
37. See Karst, supra note 31. Professor Karst notes, that "the equality principle is becoming
a preferred ground for decision. The reasons are easy to see. The principle permits the Court to
protect first amendment activity without making a frontal attack on the legitimacy of the interest
by which the state seeks to justify its regulation." Id. at 66-67 (footnote omitted). See also Com-
ment, Equal But Inadequate Protection" A Look at Aosley and Grayned, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 469, 480 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as Equal But Inadequate Protection ].
38. See Bogen, First Amendment Ancillary Doctrines, 37 MD. L. REV. 679 (1978). The Court
may find, for example, that the government regulation is an unconstitutional "prior restraint" on
speech, e.g., prohibiting the speech before it is judicially determined whether the speech is consti-
tutionally protected. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
The Court may determine that a law is "overbroad," curtailing more speech than is necessary to
promote a legitimate governmental interest. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). A
statute impinging on speech may be struck down under the "void for vagueness" doctrine. Thus,
if a law is unclear as to its scope, possibly including protected speech, it may not survive first
amendment scrutiny. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
39. See Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422
(1980) [hereinafter referred to as Emerson].
40. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), where the Court upheld a conviction for
violating a state obscenity statute. The petitioner had been convicted for distributing advertise-
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libel,4 1 "fighting" words,42 and speech that presents a "clear and pres-
ent danger, ' 43 the courts usually begin their analysis of speech-access
cases by determining the amount of scrutiny they will use to review the
regulation.
Under a first amendment analysis, the United States Supreme
Court has sometimes subjected the government's justifications for the
regulation to strict or "exacting" scrutiny. The government must then
show that its justifications are "compelling" and that the method it
used to further its interest is the "least drastic means," ie., the method
that least curtails speech and still promotes that interest.44 The Court
has not clearly stated when the strict scrutiny test should be applied,
although one writer has suggested that the test is used often when the
speech is political in nature or the governmental regulation is a prior
restraint on speech.45 The Court, however, has on occasion applied less
exacting scrutiny. Some members of the Court have advocated using
less exacting scrutiny when they have viewed the speech in question as
having little social value or the regulation as having an insignificant
impact on speech. 46  Under that test the Court will uphold an impor-
ments containing pictures of persons engaged in sexual activities. See also Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957).
41. Libel, which involves the printing of defamatory falsehoods, is one category of speech
where the Court has relaxed its presumption that the speech is not protected. See New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), where the Court held that the first amendment protection
of free speech and press limit state powers to award damages for libel when the person claiming
the defamation is a public official. Under New York Times, a public official cannot recover "dam-
ages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with 'actual malice,'" that is, with "knowledge that [the defamatory falsehood] was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 279-80.
42. See, e.g., Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), where the Court upheld a
conviction for violating a statute which prohibited persons from saying "any offensive, derisive, or
annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place." Id. at 569.
The petitioner was convicted for calling the town marshall a "damned Fascist" and "damned
racketeer" on a public street. The Court held that such words were "fighting" words, those likely
to inflict injury or provoke an immediate breach of the peace, and hence, were not protected. Id.
at 573-74.
43. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), where the petitioner, a leader of a Ku
Klux Klan group, was convicted of 'advocat[ing] the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabo-
tage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or polit-
ical reform.' Id. at 444-45. The petitioner had publicly stated that he and other Klansmen were
going to march on Washington, D.C. The Court, in reversing the conviction, formulated what is
considered the modem "clear and present danger" test, holding that unless such advocacy is "di-
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action," the state may not forbid that speech. Id. at 444.
44. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
45. Emerson, supra note 39, at 450.
46. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion),
which involved the issue of whether a zoning ordinance prohibiting, in part, "adult" theaters from
being within 1,000 feet of other regulated establishments, such as pool halls, violated the first
amendment. Although the theaters did not show films that were "obscene" as defined by the
NOTES AND COMMENTS
tant governmental interest merely if it is shown that the regulation only
incidentally regulates speech, that it is unrelated to the suppression of
expression, and that the regulation is no more burdensome than is rea-
sonably necessary to protect the governmental interest. 47 Under either
test, the Court weighs the government's justifications for the access reg-
ulation against the speech interests involved, tipping the scale in favor
of the individual under strict scrutiny, and in favor of the government
under a less exacting scrutiny. The Court has been inconsistent in its
use and application of these tests, and one prominent writer has sug-
gested that the tests are almost meaningless.
4 8
An access regulation which is susceptible to attack under the first
amendment may also sometimes be attacked under the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment.4 9 When, for example, an ac-
cess regulation treats differently two groups of people who are in
similar positions with respect to the regulation,5 0 the Court may use an
equal protection analysis.5 ' When the regulation impinges on the fun-
damental right of one group, but not on the fundamental right of an-
other group similarly situated, the Court will subject the regulation to
strict scrutiny.5 2 Although the rights found in the Constitution's Bill of
Court, the ordinance was upheld. First, the plurality noted that the ordinance would not have a
significant impact on first amendment freedoms. Id. at 60. Secondly, the plurality noted that
"society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magni-
tude than the interest in untrammeled political debate." Id. at 70.
47. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
48. Emerson, supra note 39, at 440. Professor Emerson notes:
In essence, the balancing doctrine is no doctrine at all but merely a skeleton structure on
which to throw any facts, reasons, or speculations that may be considered relevant. Not
only are there no comparable units to weigh against each other, but the test is so vague as
to yield virtually any result in any case.
Id.
49. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). See generally NOWAK, supra note 31, at
676.
50. The classifications are not tested to determine if the groups are actually different, e.g.,
men and women, but whether the groups are different in terms of the end the governmental regu-
lation is trying to achieve. Thus, in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Court held that gender
was an unconstitutional basis to determine who is capable of being an executor of an estate. See
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), where the Court held that peaceful nonla-
bor pickets and peaceful labor pickets could not be treated differently under an ordinance that
attempted to curb disruptions of the peace near schools. Under an equal protection analysis, the
Court determines whether the classifications that the government makes relate sufficiently to the
purpose that the government contends it is promoting. A classification can relate to the purpose in
several ways. It could totally select the wrong group of persons for a benefit or burden. The
classification may be under-inclusive, whereby it includes only a small number of persons who fit
the purpose of the law, but does not include other persons who are similarly situated. A classifica-
tion may be over-inclusive in that it includes some persons who do not belong in the class that
should receive the benefit or burden. The classification may be both over- and under-inclusive at
the same time. See NOWAK, supra note 31, at 520-21.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 524-25.
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Rights are fundamental for purposes of applying the equal protection
clause, 53 the Court rarely engages in an equal protection analysis when
those rights are involved because the pertinent amendment provides
specific protection for the claimed right.5 4 The Court has identified
certain fundamental rights, such as the right to exercise the voting
franchise55 and the right of interstate travel,5 6 that are not specifically
protected by the Bill of Rights and these rights are more likely targets
for an equal protection analysis. Under the strict scrutiny of an equal
protection analysis, as in the first amendment analysis, the government
must show a compelling interest for the classification.5 7 Similarly, the
government must also show it used the "least restrictive means" to fur-
ther that interest.
5 8
The Court, however, will not apply strict scrutiny to equal protec-
tion claims unless there is a fundamental right involved, or the classifi-
cation is otherwise suspect as, for example, a classification which
discriminates on the basis of race,59 or national origin.60 The Court
then will apply the rational basis test, where the burden is on the plain-
tiffs to show that the regulation is irrational.61 If the Court determines
that the regulation is in any way rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose, it will be upheld. 62 Thus, the selection of the stan-
53. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (first amendment).
54. NOWAK, supra note 31, at 675.
55. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
56. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
57. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). The Court said that the
interest must be "substantial" but Professor Gunther insists that the scrutiny applied was the strict
"compelling interest" kind of scrutiny. See Gunther, Foreward. In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter
referred to as Gunther]. It seems that the Court has at times used "substantial," "compelling" or
"important" interchangeably under both the equal protection clause and first amendment analy-
ses. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting), which upheld an air
force regulation requiring that servicemen obtain prior approval from the base commander before
circulating petitions on base. Justice Brennan, arguing for a strict scrutiny standard, used the
words "compelling" and "important" interchangeably. Id. at 364.
Several commentators have indicated that the Burger Court now frequently employs a "mid-
dle level" standard of review in equal protection cases. Although the standard of review is still
strict in these cases, it seems to be different than either the compelling interset test or the rational
basis test. The Court has not expressly stated that there is a "middle level" standard of review.
See Gunther, supra; Nowak, Realigning the Standards ofReview Under the Equal Protection Guar-
antee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Class~fcation, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974); Note, Equal
Protection and Due Process Contrasting Methods of Review under Fourteenth Amendment Doc-
trine, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529 (1979).
58. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972).
59. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. i (1967).
60. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
61. NOWAK, supra note 31, at 524.
62. See McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802 (1969), where the Court rejected an
equal protection challenge to an Illinois law that did not include prisoners awaiting trial in a
county jail in the class of persons entitled to absentee ballots. The Court stated:
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dard of review will usually determine whether a regulation is found
unconstitutional. The strict scrutiny standard, under both the first and
fourteenth amendments, is " 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact," whereas
the rational basis standard in reality subjects regulations to hardly any
scrutiny at all.
63
Regulation of Speech Access.- Prohibition Against
Content-Based Discrimination
If the government discriminates among speakers by regulating ac-
cess to public property on the basis of the speaker's message, the Court
will generally apply the almost fatal strict scrutiny analysis to the
case.64 This is true whether the Court analyzes the government's regu-
lation under the first amendment or under the equal protection
clause. 65 In Madison School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission,66 the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny under a first
amendment analysis to strike down a regulation that prohibited some
persons from addressing a school board at a public meeting.67 A non-
union teacher in Madison School District spoke up against adopting a
"fair share" clause, requiring both non-union and union teachers to
pay union dues, during a public school board meeting.68 Union repre-
sentatives, who were negotiating a new contract with the school board,
objected to the board's decision to allow the non-union teacher to
speak. Subsequently, the union sought and obtained an order from the
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission prohibiting anyone, ex-
cept union representatives, from addressing the board "on matters sub-
ject to collective bargaining. ' 69 The Court held that the order violated
the first amendment, explaining that when a governmental body opens
a forum to the public, it may not "discriminate between speakers on the
basis of their employment, or the content of their speech." 70 The Court
The distinctions drawn by a challenged statute must bear some rational relationship to a
legitimate state end and will be set aside as violative of the Equal Protection Clause only
if based on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of that goal. Legislatures are pre-
sumed to have acted constitutionally even if source materials normally resorted to for
ascertaining their grounds for action are otherwise silent, and their statutory classifica-
tions will be set aside only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them.
Id. at 809. See also Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
63. Gunther, supra note 57, at 8.
64. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); see Stone, supra note 7; Farber, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980).
65. See NOWAK, supra note 31, at 675-76.
66. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
67. Id. at 169.
68. Id. at 171-72.
69. Id. at 176.
70. Id. at 174.
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explained that the school board had opened a portion of the meeting to
comments from the general public and that the commission's order
prohibited the non-union teacher's speech on the basis of the content of
his message.
7
Similarly, in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 72 the Court
addressed the question of whether an ordinance that prohibited picket-
ing within 150 feet of city schools while the schools were in session, but
exempted "peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dis-
pute,"73 violated the equal protection clause. Prior to the enactment of
the ordinance, Mosley, a federal postal employee, had peacefully pick-
eted in front of a local high school to protest alleged racial discrimina-
tion there. After inquiring whether the ordinance pertained to his
solitary picketing, Mosley was told by Chicago police that he would be
arrested if he picketed in front of the school. He brought suit alleging
that the ordinance violated his first amendment right of freedom of
speech, and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief.
The Mosley Court first noted that since the ordinance treated labor
picketing differently from other picketing, the ordinance should be ana-
lyzed in terms of the equal protection clause. 74 The Court stated, how-
ever, that the "equal protection claim in this case is closely intertwined
with First Amendment interests,' 75 and proceeded to speak of the first
amendment as well as the equal protection clause. The Mosley Court
held that the ordinance violated the equal protection clause because it
denied access to some pickets on the basis of the content of their
message.76 The Court said that the government can impose "[neutral]
time, place and circumstance" 77 restraints on speech in public places
71. Id. at 176. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin had held that the order was constitutional
because the teacher's speech before the school board presented a "clear and present danger" to
bargaining exclusivity granted by state statute. The Court found that argument unpersuasive,
stating: "Assuming arguendo, that such a 'danger' might in some circumstances justify some limi-
tation of First Amendment rights, we are unable to read this record as presenting such danger as
would justify curtailing speech." Id. at 174. The Court also used two ancillary doctrines to strike
down the order. First, the Court said that the order was "overbroad" because practically any
subject concerning school operations could be a subject of collective bargaining. Id. at 176-77.
Second, the Court said that because the order prohibited future speech and conduct it was the
"essence of prior restraint." Id. at 177. Arguably the order could have been held to be unconstitu-
tional under the equal protection clause as well. The order, like the ordinance in Police Dep't of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) prohibiting non-labor pickets, discriminated on the basis of
speech content. See Princeton Educ. Ass'n v. Princeton Bd. of Educ., 480 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Ohio
1979).
72. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
73. Id. at 93.
74. Id. at 94-95.
75. Id. at 95.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 99.
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deemed to be public forums. The Court found, however, that Chi-
cago's anti-picketing ordinance went beyond those "neutral"
constraints:
The central problem with Chicago's ordinance is that it describes
permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter. Peaceful picket-
ing on the subject of a school's labor-management dispute is permit-
ted, but all other peaceful picketing is prohibited. The operative
distinction is the message on a picket sign. But, above all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.
78
The Mosley Court held that, when the government selectively excludes
a group from a public place on the basis of the content of the group's
message, its justifications must be "carefully scrutinized." 79 Applying
an equal protection, strict scrutiny analysis to the ordinance, the Court
held that it had to be "tailored to serve a substantial government inter-
est,"80 if it was to be upheld. In the case of the ordinance in Mosley,
there was no substantial government justification to discriminate be-
tween peaceful labor picketing and peaceful non-labor picketing.
8'
Public Facilities and the Public Forum
Although the Court's opinion in Mosley was couched in terms of
the equal protection clause, Mosley arguably embraced the prevailing
idea that persons have a right of speech access to public places, irre-
spective of whether the ordinance had or had not been content-based. 82
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court in Mosley, spoke of the sidewalk
as a "public forum. ' 83 Indeed, it is baffling to some that the Court did
not simply employ a public forum analysis, because the sidewalk fit
78. Id. at 95. The Court continued:
Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amend-
ment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds
acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial
views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public
facilities. There is an "equality of status in the field of ideas," and government must
afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is opened up to
an assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from
assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions
from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by
reference to content alone.
Id. at 96 (footnote omitted).
79. Id. at 99.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 100.
82. Id. at 95. See generally Fora Americana, supra note 2.
83. 408 U.S. at 95. Justice Marshall also discussed "time, place and circumstance" regula-
tions associated with the public forum doctrine. Id. at 99.
1097
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
neatly within the Court's view of what constitutes a "public forum. '84
Ever since Justice Robert's concurring opinion in Hague v. C1 Q *,85 the
right of speech access to public streets and parks had been recognized
as part of the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.
8 6
From Hague sprang the theory that streets and parks-places that have
"traditionally" been used for public assembly-are "public forums,"
and speech exercised in these places is afforded a substantial degree of
protection.8 7 The government may enact reasonable "time, place and
manner" 88 restrictions on speech in the public forum, but it may not
prohibit speech on the basis of its content.
Then, in Grayned v. City of Rockford,89 the Court formulated what
appeared to be an extension of the "traditional" test. Prior to Grayned,
only a few cases had advocated extending the first amendment's public
forum doctrine to include nontraditional public places. 90 In Grayned,
the Court stated that the "crucial question" in determining if a particu-
lar place is a public forum is "whether the manner of expression is
basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at
a particular time." 91 The Grayned Court struck down an anti-picketing
ordinance similar to the ordinance in Mosley, but upheld an anti-noise
ordinance that prohibited disturbances near schools while schools were
in session. The petitioners, demonstrators who had been arrested
under the ordinances for protesting alleged racial inequalities at a local
high school, argued that the anti-noise ordinance was overbroad, and
thus, impinged on protected speech.92 The Grayned Court, which con-
strued the anti-noise ordinance as only prohibiting that speech which
"materially disrupts" classwork,93 found the anti-noise ordinance to be
a reasonable "time, place and manner" restriction.94
Nontraditional Forums and Speech Access
Some writers have argued that the "incompatibility" test formu-
84. See Equal But Inadequate Protection, supra note 37.
85. 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, I., concurring).
86. See, e.g., Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
(1941); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
87. See generally Kalven, supra note 4.
88. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941). See generally Fora Americana, supra note 2.
89. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
90. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (dicta); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966)
(plurality opinion) (right of access to public library).
91. 408 U.S. at 116.
92. Id. at 114-15.
93. Id. at 118.
94. Id. at 121.
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lated in Grayned was an expansion of the "traditional" test to include
more property in the public forum.95 Despite this view, the Court has
been unable to establish satisfactory solutions to speech-access claims
when the public property involved does not fit within the category of a
"traditional" public forum. 96 When the nature of the particular public
property has created a tension between the first amendment right of
access and an important governmental interest in assuring a more lim-
ited access, the Court has not adhered to the principles enunciated in
Mosley, Grayned and other public forum cases.
In Greer v. Spock 97 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
regulation that prohibited, in part, "political speeches" at a military
base. Political candidates who sought to conduct meetings and cam-
paign at the base were denied access on the basis of the regulation.
Large portions of the base had always been open to the public. Mem-
bers of the public intent on entering the base were greeted with a large
"Visitors Welcome" sign. Several major streets ran through the base.
Speakers had also been invited to talk at the base on a variety of topics
such as drug abuse and business management. 98 The candidates only
claimed a right of access to those parts of the base that were open to the
general public.99 The Greer Court noted, however, that unlike streets
and parks, which traditionally have served as forums for public debate,
a military base was not a public forum.1°° Thus, the Court applied
rational basis scrutiny to review the regulation. The Court concluded
that the regulation was a reasonable way to protect the military's inter-
est in maintaining political neutrality.' 0'
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Greer, noted that the
military commander had not selectively excluded some candidates
based on their political views.'0 2 Justice Powell, concurring, added that
the regulation would have been reviewed under a strict scrutiny stan-
dard had the commander discriminated between politicians by choos-
ing among the viewpoints he liked or disliked, instead of excluding all
politicians from the base "objectively and evenhandedly." 0 3 Thus, the
95. See Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 565, 574-75 (1980) [hereinafter
referred to as Shiffrin]; Fora Americana, supra note 2, at 251.
96. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion). See generally The Public Forum, supra note 4, at 118.
97. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
98. Id. at 831.
99. Id. at 858.
100. Id. at 838.
101. Id. at 838-39.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 848 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring); see id. at 839.
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Greer Court distinguished between regulations that remove entire sub-
jects from being discussed in a forum and supposedly more onerous
regulations that allow only some viewpoints on a given subject to be
expressed in a forum.'O4
Several commentators have argued that the Greer decision is an
aberration, wrongly decided, and that the prohibition against content-
based speech discrimination should apply full force. 0 5 The Greer
Court had much difficulty in distinguishing a prior decision in which it
held that a public street on a military base was a public forum. 0 6 Sec-
ondly, the prohibition against content-based speech regulation does not
depend on whether the public property in question is a public forum.
Whether the forum in Greer was public or not, the government was still
granting access to some persons, while denying access to others, solely
because the latter wanted to discuss politics. The Court's distinction
between regulations that remove an entire subject from the forum and
regulations that allow the subject to be discussed, but only from certain
viewpoints, is an unreasonable dividing line. Both subject-matter
speech restrictions and viewpoint-based speech restrictions fall under
the general umbrella of content-based speech regulation. 0 7 Both place
the government in the position of a censor, deciding what speech it
considers appropriate for a particular place. Prior decisions such as
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley'08 had not distinguished be-
tween subject-matter and viewpoint-based speech regulation. 0 9
The Greer decision, however, illustrates the difficulty of grappling
with speech-access claims to public property when the property does
104. Id See Stone, supra note 7, at 95. See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion). The Young plurality upheld an ordinance that prohibited
"adult" movie theaters from being located within 1,000 feet of other regulated uses, such as pool
halls, and within 500 feet of a residential area. Although the theaters did not show obscene mov-
ies, the plurality held that sometimes content-based speech restrictions will be upheld. Id. at 65-
66. The plurality stated, however, there is a "need for absolute neutrality by the government; its
regulation of communication may not be affected by sympathy or hostility for the point of view
being expressed by the communicator." Id. at 67 (emphasis added). But see Metromedia Inc. v.
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion), where the Court rejected the distinction be-
tween content-based and viewpoint-based speech discrimination; however, the distinction still has
its adherents on the Court. See id. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. See Stone, supra note 7, at 95; Shiffrin, supra note 95, at 576; Zillman and Imwinkelried,
The Legacy of Greer v. Spock." The Public Forum Doctrine and the Principle of the Military's Polit-
ical Neutrality, 65 GEo. L.J. 773 (1977).
106. Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972) (per curiam). The majority in Greer stated
that the military officials in Flower had "abandoned" any claim to the street. 424 U.S. at 837.
Justice Brennan, dissenting, noted that the majority's attempt to distinguish Greer from Flower "is
wholly unconvincing, both on the facts and in its rationale." Id. at 849 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. See generally Stone, supra note 7.
108. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
109. Stone, supra note 7, at 86-87.
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not fall neatly within the "traditional" concept of the public forum,
especially where the government asserts an interest in limiting access to
the forum which, in the Court's view, conflicts sharply with the first
amendment claim. The interest asserted by the government in defense
of the limitation will often vary, depending on the nature of the prop-
erty involved. The interest of the government expressed in Greer in
limiting speech access to a military base in an effort to preserve military
neutrality, for example, differs from a public school board's justifica-
tions for limiting access to its school mail system designed only for in-
ter-school communication. The Supreme Court has neither addressed
whether inter-school mail systems are public forums, nor determined
the standard of review applicable where a school district grants access
to such systems to one teachers' association, but denies access to a com-
peting association.
INTER-SCHOOL MAIL SYSTEMS: THE OTHER CIRCUITS
Prior to Hohlt, the two federal circuit courts that had considered
provisions granting exclusive access to one employee group to use in-
ter-school mail systems followed a number of lower federal and state
court decisions that had found similar provisions to be constitu-
tional. I l0 In Memphis American Federation of Teachers v. Board of Edu-
cation,"' a collective bargaining agreement allowed the recognized
teachers' association" 2 to use the inter-school mail system, school bul-
letin boards and other facilities.'3 An association, composed of a mi-
nority of the school district's teachers," 4 sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, claiming that the exclusive access provision violated
the association's first amendment and equal protection rights. The fed-
eral district court held that there was no first amendment violation, but
found that the provision was unconstitutional on the basis of the equal
110. See Federation of Del. Teachers v. De La Warr Bd. of Educ., 335 F. Supp. 385 (D. Del.
1971); Local 858, Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. School Dist. of Denver, 314 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Colo.
1970) (both cases upheld the constitutionality of provisions that granted majority associations ex-
clusive access to bulletin boards and inter-school mail systems); Clark County Classroom Teacher
Ass'n v. Clark County School Dist., 91 Nev. 143, 532 P.2d 1032 (1975) (dicta); Civil Serv. Employ-
ees Ass'n v. State Univ. of Stony Brook, 82 Misc. 2d 334, 368 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1974) (mem.) (meet-
ing rooms).
111. 534 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1976).
112. The term "recognized teachers' association" for the purpose of this case comment means
an association that has been granted the right to represent a district's teachers for collective bar-
gaining purposes.
113. 534 F.2d at 701.
114. The district had about 5,400 teachers. More than 90 percent were represented by the
recognized association, which had to represent two-thirds of the teachers to maintain its recog-
nized status. The minority association represented less than 300 teachers. Id. at 701.
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protection clause." 15
In reversing the district court decision, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Memphis American Federation of
Teachers determined that the access provision did not place the school
board in a position of regulating speech content or subject matter, nor
was the provision an attempt by the school board to "[censor or pro-
mote] a particular point of view.""16 Rather, the court stated, the access
provision was a privilege only granted on the premise that the recog-
nized association represented and continued to represent at least two-
thirds of the teachers in the school system." 7 The court concluded that,
since the school board was not attempting to censor the minority asso-
ciation's messages, its members' first amendment rights were not
impaired.
The minority association's equal protection claim did not fare any
better. The court viewed access to the mail system not as a "right" but
as a "privilege" based on the majority association's membership as de-
termined by the school board. Because the court decided that the pro-
vision did not impair the fundamental right of freedom of speech, but
merely withheld a privilege, it determined that the rational basis test,
not strict scrutiny, should be applied to review the equal protection
claim." 18 The school board argued that the exclusive access provision
promoted labor peace in a school system that had two competing teach-
ers' associations. Moreover, the school board argued that the provision
promoted labor stability because the provision was an attempt to ac-
commodate the largest number of teachers. The board also argued that
granting access to the minority association would place an undue strain
on school facilities.' '9 The Sixth Circuit agreed that the provision was
rationally related to the school board's legitimate interest in promoting
labor peace and stability in the school system. 20
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Con-
necticut State Federation of Teachers v. Board of Education Members 12'
considered a similar access provision. Five school boards gave the rec-
115. Id.
116. Id. at 702. Accord, Maryville Educators' Ass'n v. Newman, 70 A.D.2d 758, 416 N.Y.S.2d
876 (1979).
117. 534 F.2d at 703.
118. Id. at 702-03.
119. Id. at 703.
120. Id. In Federation of Del. Teachers v. De La Warr Bd. of Educ., 335 F. Supp. 385 (D.
Del. 1971) and Local 858, Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. School Dist. of Denver, 314 F. Supp. 1069 (D.
Colo. 1970), the courts used the compelling interest test, but nonetheless held there was no viola-
tion of the minority associations' constitutional rights.
121. 538 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1976).
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ognized teachers' associations in their districts the exclusive right to use
inter-school mail systems, bulletin boards and meeting rooms. The mi-
nority teachers' associations from the five school districts sought declar-
atory relief, contending that the exclusive access provisions violated
their members' first amendment and equal protection rights. 22 They
argued that the exclusive access provisions gave the majority associa-
tions an advantage in attracting members. 23 The associations also
contended that the school boards had failed to show that the discipline
and operation of the schools would be substantially impaired if they
were granted access to school facilities. 24 They contended that the dis-
trict court had erred when it applied the rational basis test, instead of
the compelling interest test.
125
The Second Circuit, in affirming the lower court decision, stated
that before the strict scrutiny standard could be applied it first had to
be shown that the access provisions infringed on the minority associa-
tions' first amendment rights. 26  The Second Circuit stated that the
school facilities were not public forums, in the traditional sense like
streets and parks, so the associations did not have a general first
amendment right of access to them. 27 The court also noted that the
associations had alternative means of communicating with their mem-
bers, such as meeting off-campus after school, talking to members dur-
ing free periods in the teachers' lounges, and calling teachers at
home. 128 Thus, the court concluded that the impairment of the associa-
tions' exercise of speech was "so inconsequential" that the provisions
could not be considered to violate the first amendment.129 The Second
Circuit abstained on the equal protection claim, deciding that there was
a state law susceptible of an interpretation that would make it unneces-
122. Id. at 476.
123. Id. at 477.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 479.
127. Id. at 480.
128. Id. at 481.
129. Id. The court also expressed concern about involving itself in a labor squabble:
This case presents the all-too-familiar situation in which a dispute, commonplace in the
private sector, becomes constitutional litigation by virtue of the fact that public employ-
ers (the school boards) are involved, rather than private entities, and the plaintiffs are,
therefore, able to turn a problem of labor relations into a constitutional issue. Mindful
of the undesirability of becoming entangled in the operation of local school systems, we
nevertheless must address this case in a constitutional . . . framework.
Id. at 478. Other courts have expressed the same concerns. See North County Fed'n of Teachers
v. North St. Francis School Dist., 103 L.R.R.M. 2865 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Geiger v. Duval County
School Bd., 357 So. 2d 442 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1978).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
sary to address the constitutional question. 30 In Perry Local Educators'
Association v. Hohlt,131 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit addressed similar issues.
PERRY LOCAL EDUCATORS' ASSOCIATION V. HOHLT
Facts of the Case
Every teacher at each of the thirteen schools in the Metropolitan
School District of Perry Township in Marion County, Indiana, was
provided with a mail slot. The district also had an inter-school mail
system whereby administrators could quickly communicate with teach-
ers at the various schools. 132 Teachers also could use the mail system
and both the Perry Education Association and the Perry Local Educa-
tors' Association had access to the mail slots.
However, in 1977, PLEA challenged PEA in an election to become
the recognized teachers' association in the school district. PEA re-
tained its status as the recognized teachers' association and subse-
quently negotiated a contract with the school board which was ratified
in July, 1978. PEA, which anticipated continued opposition from
PLEA, obtained a provision in the labor contract giving it the exclusive
right to use the school district's inter-school mail system. 133 Teachers,
however, could still use the system for personal messages; the provision
only concerned the mail system. PLEA was free to use the school bul-
letin boards, hold meetings on school property after school hours and
to make announcements over the school public address systems if it
obtained prior approval from the school principal. Community organi-
zations such as the Cub Scouts, parochial schools and local church
groups also could use the inter-school mail system with prior
130. 538 F.2d at 482-87. The court stated that a state statute prohibiting, among other things,
"discriminatory practices" among labor associations, could be construed by the state courts as
barring the access provisions. Since the state law was unclear, the court concluded that the equal
protection issue could be avoided if the statute was interpreted by the state court. Id. at 484. The
court said that by abstaining, it "avoids unnecessary federal-state friction, and promotes the vital
policy of judicial review that dictates against unnecessary or premature resolution of a federal
constitutional question." Id. at 484.
131. 652 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 51 U.S.L.W. 4165 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1983).
132. Id. at 1286-87.
133. The provision stated:
C. The Association [PEA] is permitted access to teachers' mailboxes in which to insert
material, provided the Association makes a copy available to the building principal in
advance of the distribution. The Association's sponsorship shall appear on all materials
which are distributed through teachers' mailboxes. The rights and privileges of the Asso-
ciation, acting as the representative of the teachers ... shall not be granted to any other
school employee organization. ...
Id. at 1288 n.l.
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approval. 34
Following ratification of the teachers' contract, PLEA and two of
its members filed an action in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana against PEA and the school board mem-
bers, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages.135 PLEA
claimed that the exclusive access provision violated its members' first
amendment and equal protection rights. On cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment, the district court entered judgment for PEA and the
school board members. The district court, relying on Connecticut State
Federation of Teachers,136 held that there was no substantial infringe-
ment on PLEA's first amendment rights because PLEA had other ade-
quate means of communicating with its members and because the mail
system was not a public forum. 137 Then the court, relying on Memphis
American Federation of Teachers, 38 held that the exclusive access pro-
vision was rationally related to the school board's legitimate interest in
ensuring labor peace, and hence, that it did not violate the equal pro-
tection clause.1
39
The Seventh Circuit's Decision
PLEA appealed the summary judgment, and the case was heard
by a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.140 Because the school board was a government em-
ployer,' 4' the Seventh Circuit began its analysis by determining the ap-
plicable standards of review under the first amendment and the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Following the Second Circuit in Connecticut State Federation of
Teachers, 42 the Hohlt court determined that the inter-school mail sys-
tem was not a public forum, stating that the school board could "close
134. Id. at 1288.
135. Damages were sought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See 652 F.2d at 1288-89.
136. 538 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1976).
137. 652 F.2d at 1289.
138. 534 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1976).
139. 652 F.2d at 1289. The district court's opinion is unreported.
140. The panel consisted of Chief Judge Fairchild, Circuit Judge Cummings, and Senior Cir-
cuit Judge Wisdom, of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, who was sitting by
designation. Judge Wisdom was the author of the opinion. Id. at 1287.
141. The court, noting that the actions of the school board did not come under the purview of
the National Labor Relations Act, nonetheless stated that the access provision would constitute an
unfair labor practice tinder the Act. Id. at 1290. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322
(1974), where the Court struck down a contract provision that gave an electrical union the exclu-
sive right to post notices on manufacturing plant bulletin boards.
142. 538 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1976).
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it to all but official business if it chooses."' 143 But, unlike the Second
Circuit, the Hohit court was unpersuaded that the absence of a public
forum and the availability of alternative means of communication
made it unnecessary to continue its inquiry as to whether the provision
violated the first amendment. The Hohit court stated that the first
amendment's prohibition against content-based speech regulation op-
erated independently of the public forum analysis. 44
However, the Hoht court observed that the Supreme Court had
occasionally upheld content-based regulations that limited access to
some public places that were not considered by the Court to be public
forums under the traditional test. The Hohlt court noted, for example,
that the Supreme Court in Greer v. Spock 145 had upheld a regulation
that prohibited political candidates from campaigning on a military
base. The Seventh Circuit stated, however, that, unlike the neutral sub-
ject-matter speech regulation in Greer, the Perry Township school ac-
cess provision was viewpoint-based' 46 -a more onerous kind of
content-based regulation that the Greer Court stated it was unwilling to
uphold as constitutional. 47 The Hohit court explained that, unlike the
evenhanded exclusion of all politicians from the military base in Greer,
the Perry Township School Board did not evenhandedly exclude all
union speech. Instead, only the teachers who belonged to PLEA were
prohibited from using the mail system to communicate with other
teachers on labor issues. ' 48 Because only PEA had access to the system
to disseminate literature on labor issues, the provision effectively fa-
vored PEA's viewpoint on those issues over PLEA's viewpoint. By
favoring one viewpoint over another, the school board was engaging in
prohibited censorship. The court explained:
Censorship, broadly defined as an attempt by the government to sup-
press the expression of disfavored points of view by private individu-
als, is a relative concept; it is defined by reference to the
opportunities for expression opened to favored or neutral view-
points. . . . [Ilt may easily take the form of amplifying favored or
neutral speech, rather than stifling the disfavored.' 49
Thus, the Hohit court determined that it had to strictly scrutinize the
access provision. The fact that PLEA had alternative means of com-
municating with its members, the court noted, did not alone justify re-
143. 652 F.2d at 1301.
144. Id. at 1298.
145. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
146. 652 F.2d at 1294-96.
147. Id. at 1293 n.29.
148. Id. at 1296.
149. Id. at 1293-94.
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stricting access to one forum when the restriction was content-based. ' 5 0
The Hohlt court also stated that the "same standard of review may
be derived from the equal protection clause."'' 5 Although the Seventh
Circuit noted that "in principle" strict scrutiny under the first amend-
ment might afford more protection than it would under the equal pro-
tection clause, the court could see "no substantial difference" between
the standards used under the first amendment and equal protection
clause when the courts reviewed claims of equal speech access.' 52 The
Seventh Circuit stated that, because the first amendment guarantee of
freedom of speech is a fundamental right, any discriminatory classifica-
tion that impinges on that right requires the courts to apply the strict
scrutiny standard to review the government's justifications under an
equal protection analysis. 153 Returning to its discussion of viewpoint-
based speech regulation, the Hohft court stated that, when the govern-
ment grants speech access to one group, but denies access to another
group based on the latter's viewpoint, thus engaging in censorship, the
regulation discriminatorily impinges on the latter group's fundamental
speech rights. Thus, the court found that the strict scrutiny standard
applied. 154
PEA and the school board argued that the exclusive access provi-
sion was needed by PEA to carry out its legal duties as the recognized
teachers' association in the school district. 55 The Seventh Circuit in
Hohit first determined whether the exclusive access provision was the
least restrictive way to allow PEA to carry out its legal responsibilities.
The provision, the court concluded, was not the least restrictive means
of promoting PEA's interest in meeting its legal obligations because it
did not limit PEA's use of the mail system to those messages relating to
150. Id. at 1299. The court also stated that alternative methods of communication would be
much less effective. The court explained that off-campus mailing would be more expensive than
the inter-school system and mass telephoning would be more cumbersome. Hand-delivering
messages would be very time consuming, and posting messages on bulletin boards or making
announcements over the public address systems did not give PLEA the opportunity to explain its
messages in much detail. The court said "meetings on school property after school hours only
permit PLEA to preach to the converted." Id.
The court also criticized the Second Circuit's assertion in Connecticut State Fed. of Teachers
v. Board of Educ., 538 F.2d 471, 481 (2d Cir. 1976), that the speech involved was of "limited
public interest." The court stated that unions often attempt to influence government decision-
making. Id at 1298. The court also said that the value of the speech in question is irrelevant as to
whether speech is protected by the first amendment. Id. at 1299.
151. Id. at 1296.
152. Id. at 1296-97.
153. Id. at 1296.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1300.
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its official duties. 5 6 The Hohft court also chose to scrutinize the justifi-
cation itself. The court found that the school board had "no discernible
state interest" in making PEA's access exclusive because it had not
shown that PEA would not be able to meet its obligations, or that the
school district would incur "significant additional expenses" if PLEA
were granted access to the inter-school mail system.- 57
PEA and the school board also argued that the provision pro-
moted labor peace because it prevented possible confficts between PEA
and PLEA, which had been vying for membership among the district's
teachers. 58 While the Hohlt court accepted the school board's justifi-
cation as legitimate, it found the justification inadequate in this case
because the school board had failed to show that such a disruption
would occur if PLEA were granted access to the system.' 59 Moreover,
the Seventh Circuit noted that the alternative methods of communica-
tion available to PLEA, such as face-to-face contact in the teachers'
lounges, were more likely to provoke teachers and prompt labor unrest,
than the mail messages which a teacher could toss into a waste basket
without even reading. 60 Therefore, the court concluded that the
school board did not have a substantial interest in promulgating the
access provision, and held that the provision violated both the first
amendment and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
ANALYSIS
The Hohit opinion offers an alternative way of viewing public
school teachers' claims of speech access to inter-school mail systems.
Unlike the prior federal circuit court decisions, the Hohlt court held
that PLEA had an equal right of speech access to the inter-school mail
system. In reaching its conclusion that PLEA had an equal, but not
absolute, right of access, the Hohit court discussed both the issue of
content-based speech regulation and the public forum doctrine. For
purposes of analysis, the Hohit court's treatment of each of these issues
will be discussed separately.
Content-Based Speech Regulation
The inherent difficulty with the Hohlt decision is that it still leaves
156. Id.
157. Id.




room for the government to engage in censorship, a practice that the
first amendment prohibits.' 6' Although the Seventh Circuit recognized
that the underlying constitutional problem with the access provision in
Hohit was that it was content-based, the court's decision does not offer
protection against all content-based speech regulation. Instead, under
the Hohit court's reasoning, school boards may deny access to inter-
school mail systems to both teachers' associations, yet continue to allow
teachers to send messages unrelated to labor issues via the mail system.
In finding that PLEA had a right of equal access, the Hohit court
distinguished between subject-matter speech discrimination and restric-
tions that discriminate between viewpoints on given subjects. In the
former, the government removes the discussion of an entire subject
from a given forum. 62 In the latter, the government allows the subject
to be discussed in the forum, but only from certain viewpoints. The
Sixth Circuit in Memphis American Federation of Teachers, 63 address-
ing facts similar to those in the Hohlt case, did not find a viewpoint-
based speech regulation. The Sixth Circuit stated that the board policy
was neutral as to speech content because the school board did not at-
tempt to "[censor or promote] a particular point of view."164 The Sixth
Circuit based this conclusion on the fact that exclusive access to the
mail system was granted to the majority association because of the as-
sociation's status as representative of two-thirds of the school system's
teachers. 65 The Sixth Circuit failed to see that, even if the board was
not attempting to censor a particular point of view, by agreeing to the
exclusive access provision, it did just that. While it may be true that the
Memphis School Board favored neither of the association's viewpoints,
the board in effect sanctioned one viewpoint on labor matters just be-
cause that viewpoint had more adherents.
In contrast, the Hohlt court determined that if the provision had
the "effect" of favoring one viewpoint over another "on an identifiable
issue," the strict scrutiny standard should apply.166 The Hohlt court
reasoned that, when access is predicated on the identity of the speaker,
exclusive access provisions "almost invariably are not neutral with re-
spect to the viewpoints they tend to disfavor."' 67 The court concluded
that presumption should be enough to trigger a strict scrutiny analysis
161. Stone, supra note 7, at 103.
162. Id. at 83.
163. 534 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1976).
164. Id. at 702.
165. Id. at 703.
166. 652 F.2d at 1294.
167. Id. at 1295.
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because it presumes the government is engaging in censorship. The
Hohlt court observed that the access provision had the effect of favor-
ing PEA's viewpoint on labor issues because only PEA's viewpoint
could be quickly disseminated to district teachers through the mail sys-
tem. Indeed, PEA had recognized that the access provision would help
shelter it from PLEA's criticisms and help it maintain its position as the
recognized association in the school district. PEA had obtained the
provision in the collective bargaining agreement solely because it an-
ticipated continued opposition from PLEA.'
68
Although the access provision in Hohlt could be characterized as
viewpoint-based, the court failed to explain adequately why a distinc-
tion between such restrictions and subject-matter regulations should be
made. Both viewpoint-based and subject-matter speech regulations, as
logic would have it, are content-based. More important, however, is
the fact that the distinction between viewpoint-based and subject-mat-
ter speech regulations inevitably will erode the first amendment princi-
ple behind the prohibition against content-based speech regulation:
that the government may not censor protected speech. The Hohit anal-
ysis in effect invites school boards to "evenhandedly" close inter-school
mail systems to both labor associations, and, at the same time, permit
teachers to use the system for other school-related messages. Thus, the
Hohlt analysis has the possible result of prompting school boards to
permit teachers to engage in non-labor speech via the forum, but pro-
hibit labor issues from being discussed. School boards, sensitive to crit-
icism and opposition from labor groups over various issues, may very
well decide to close the mail system entirely to both associations, thus
engaging in censorship by selecting what subjects can and cannot be
discussed.
A possible reason for the court's distinction between viewpoint-
based and subject-matter speech discrimination was that it turned a
first amendment problem into one of equal protection. Although the
basis of the Hohlt decision was couched, in part, under the rhetoric of
the first amendment, the court viewed the problem as one of equal pro-
tection, guaranteeing PLEA's use of the system only if PEA were
granted access to the system by the school board. Indeed, the Hohlt
court noted that its first amendment analysis was based on the fact that
the first amendment has its own "equal protection guarantee." 169 Thus,
168. Id. at 1288.
169. The court stated:
The peculiar identity of equal protection and first amendment analyses in differential
access cases follows logically from the explicit constitutional designation of speech as
III0
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the court avoided having to determine whether school boards could bar
teachers from sending advertisements or political messages to other
teachers via the mail system,' 70 such restrictions being content-based,
subject-matter regulations. If the court were to prohibit all content-
based regulations, it would effectively turn the mail system into a pub-
lic forum, with almost unlimited access, since challenges to unequal
exclusions from the forum could often be characterized as content-
based. The court's hesitancy to burden a system designed only for a
more limited use is understandable. Nevertheless, its distinction be-
tween subject-matter regulations and presumably more onerous view-
point-based regulations, allows governmental bodies to ban certain
subjects from being discussed in a forum even when discussion of the
subjects themselves would not necessarily interfere with the official use
of the forum.
The Public Forum Doctrine
The Hohlt court's treatment of the public forum issue was brief.
Noting that the public forum doctrine has "sweeping consequences and
potentially limitless application," the Seventh Circuit observed that the
use of the doctrine had been restricted to facilities that have tradition-
ally served as places for public discourse, or to facilities "whose normal
use plainly will not be interfered with by such expression."'17, Then,
agreeing with the Second Circuit in Connecticut State Federation of
Teachers,t72 the court held that the inter-school mail system was not a
public forum. The Hohit court did not expressly state why the system
was not a public forum, noting that the public forum issue was not
dispositive of the case.1
73
Although not a public forum in the traditional sense, like streets
and parks, the inter-school mail system in Hohlt arguably met the test
enunciated in Grayned v. City of Rockford 174 as to what constitutes a
public forum. In Grayned, the Supreme Court stated that the question
fundamental and from the fact that the first amendment's proscription against censorship
is itself simply a specialized equal protection guarantee. Thus, although Mosley evi-
dently was the first case explicitly to apply the equal protection clause to differential
access cases, the analytic tools of equal protection strict scrutiny--the requirements of a
relatively important state interest, a close fit between end and means, and use of the least
restrictive alternative-were applied to content discrimination under the aegis of the first
amendment long before then.
Id. at 1296 (footnotes omitted).
170. Id. at 1301.
171. Id. at 1298.
172. 538 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1976).
173. 652 F.2d at 1297.
174. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
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to be asked was whether "the manner of expression is basically incom-
patible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular
time." 75 Neither PLEA's proposed manner of expression, nor the ex-
pression itself, was incompatible with the normal use of the mail sys-
tem. PLEA simply wished to use the system in a way it was normally
used, i.e., to send messages to teachers. Moreover, there was no show-
ing that the distribution of material on labor issues unduly interfered
with the system. PEA used the system to send messages on labor issues
to teachers, and, before the election to determine union representation,
both associations freely used the mail system.'
76
The Hohlt court, however, was faced with an unwanted result if it
held that the mail system was a public forum. A finding that a particu-
lar facility is a public forum necessarily means that the general public
has a first amendment right of access-subject to reasonable time, place
and manner restrictions-to that facility. The Hohit court noted that
"[tlhe school's interest in keeping outsiders off campus during school
hours doubtless supports appropriate restrictions on entry for the pur-
pose of using the mail system."' 77 Thus, the Hohft court apparently
was not concerned about the manner of expression but the possible
amount of expression if it held that the mail system was a public forum.
Unlimited access by the public to a facility neither designed nor capa-
ble of handling such an influx would certainly be unduly burdensome.
A related problem in holding that such a system is a public forum is the
amount of outside traffic coming into the schools to use the system, and
the possibility that such traffic might disrupt classroom instruction.
Nonetheless, the HohIt court's holding that the mail system was not a
public forum, further eroded the first amendment right of access to
public property. The HohIt opinion, in effect embracing the "tradi-
tional" view of the public forum, places further obstacles in the path of
those who wish to use so-called nontraditional public property to exer-
cise speech, even when the manner of expression does not interfere
with the function of the property. Because many nontraditional public
facilities provide an effective, and sometimes the only, method of com-
municating with government officials, the position in HohIt is
disquieting.
175. Id. at 116.
176. 652 F.2d at 1287.
177. Id. at 1301.
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A RECOMMENDED APPROACH
Another way of approaching the Hohit problem would have been
to hold that the inter-school mail system is a "limited public forum" in
the sense that it can be used freely by all school personnel. This ap-
proach would solve the underlying problems with the Hohlt court's
analysis. First, the finding that the mail system is a limited public
forum would avoid the possibility that public school boards, under the
Hohlt opinion, will engage in content-based censorship by prohibiting
teachers from discussing labor or other issues via the system. Access
would be granted on the basis of employment, instead of speech con-
tent. By granting access on the basis of employment, school boards
would have objective and neutral criteria to use in limiting access to
such systems instead of relying on speech content for the basis of the
regulation. Teachers would be free to disseminate information on any
subject via the forum, subject to reasonable time, place and manner
regulations promulgated by the school boards. Thus, school boards
could not totally ban either association, or any teacher, from using the
mail system.
Secondly, by finding that the system is a limited public forum,
school boards' interest in curbing access to a system designed to handle
a limited amount of information would be protected. Since access
would be determined on the basis of whether or not the speaker was an
employee, access to the general public could be denied entirely. Any
increase in the amount of literature disseminated by teachers could be
regulated by reasonable time, place and manner restrictions. School
boards, for example, might enact reasonable rules that would limit the
times when unofficial mail may be sent through the system, or desig-
nate certain places from which the mail must be sent, in an effort to
prevent overburdening of the system.
The concept of a limited public forum, however, can present its
own problems. Such an approach might prompt governmental officials
to arbitrarily set employment or another seemingly objective standard
in an attempt to limit speech access. Nevertheless, this problem can be
remedied when the amount of speech, not the manner, is the justifica-
tion for the restriction. Courts can require that the policy in question
be the least restrictive possible and still further the governmental inter-
est. In addressing whether the criteria used by the government are ar-
bitrary, the courts can consider several factors: the purpose for which
the facility was designed; the past and present use of the facility;
whether the group selected for the benefit of access has a special inter-
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est in using the forum over and above a general desire to use the facil-
ity; and whether the governmental grant of speech access is the
broadest possible under the circumstances.
Applying the above criteria to the Hohlt case, a policy granting
access to district teachers, but not to the general public would survive
first amendment scrutiny. The purpose of the school mail system is to
provide teachers and administrators with a quick and effective way to
communicate with each other.178 Although the mail system had been
occasionally used by outside groups, it was primarily used by school
personnel. 179 Teachers arguably would also have a special interest in
using the mail system. As the Hohlt court noted, the mail system was
the most effective and possibly the only practicable way for teachers in
a large school district to communicate with each other. 80 Teachers'
classroom effectiveness could be hampered if they did not have the
means to communicate easily with each other about teaching ideas, ed-
ucational programs or upcoming events related to their employment.
Such access would also allow teachers to make informed decisions
about subjects embraced by collective bargaining. Along with issues
such as wages and benefits, concerns about such issues as academic
freedom, classroom size, teacher competency testing, or school disci-
pline are sometimes subjects of collective bargaining. These issues ulti-
mately affect the district's students or taxpayers. Thus, if teachers were
not granted access to the system, their ability to make informed deci-
sions about important subjects embraced by collective bargaining
would be substantially hampered. Such a policy would also promote
dissension among teachers, who possibly would feel that they have no
effective way of communicating with fellow teachers on important is-
sues. That dissension could affect teachers' classroom performance or
lead to increasing conflicts between teachers and the administration.
Finally, a policy limiting access to school personnel is the broadest pos-
sible grant of speech access under the circumstances. Access by the
general public would overburden a system designed to handle a limited
amount of mail. Granting access to some outside groups but not others
could place the government in a position of arbitrarily choosing among
various groups that more often than not will have no special interest,
other than a mere desire, in using the system.
178. Id. at 1287.
179. Id. at 1287-88.
180. Id. at 1299-1300.
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CONCLUSION
Although the Seventh Circuit in Hohlt correctly recognized that
the underlying problem with the exclusive access provision was that it
was content-based, the court failed to safeguard adequately teachers'
first amendment freedoms. By distinguishing between viewpoint-based
and subject-matter speech regulations, the Seventh Circuit opened the
possibility that school boards, under its analysis, would close such sys-
tems to both teachers' associations. Such an analysis allows school
boards to choose what subjects they would permit to be discussed in the
forum. By engaging in such subject selection, school boards would be
regulating speech on the basis of its content, a practice the first amend-
ment prohibits. Another way to approach Hohlt would have been to
hold that, the mail system is a public forum, with access limited to
school personnel. That approach would have allowed for the broadest
first amendment right of access possible without burdening a mail sys-
tem designed for limited use.' 8 '
PETER J. MEYER
181. As this article was going to press, the Supreme Court decided the Hohit case. 51
U.S.L.W. 4165 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1983). By a 5-4 vote, the Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, and
held that PLEA does not have a right of access to the inter-school mail system under the first
amendment or the equal protection clause. The majority held that the mail system was "not by
tradition or designation" a public forum and that PLEA could retain exclusive access if the regu-
lation is "reasonable" and is not based on the speaker's viewpoint. Id at 4168. (emphasis added).
The majority found no viewpoint discrimination, determining that access was granted on the basis
of PLEA's status as a bargaining agent.
The majority found the exclusive access provision "reasonable" for several reasons. First, the
Court stated that the access provision was a legitimate means of allowing PLEA, as the teachers'
bargaining agent, to carry out its official obligations. Id at 4169. Second, the provision was a
means of insuring labor peace in the school district. Id Third, the access provision was reason-
able because of the "substantial" number of alternative channels of communication open to
PLEA. Id at 4170.
The majority also rejected PLEA's equal protection claim, stating that PLEA's first amend-
ment argument "fares no better in equal protection garb." Id The Court explained that its public
forum analysis had shown that PLEA does not have a first amendment fight of access to the mail
system, so the access provision does not impinge on a fundamental right. The Court concluded
that the provision need only rationally further a legitimate state purpose. The majority found the
reasons advanced by PEA and the school board for upholding the access provision under the first
amendment sufficient to reject the equal protection claim as well.
The dissenting Justices criticized the majority for disregarding "the independent First
Amendment protection afforded by the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination." Id at
4172. (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Powell and Stevens, JJ.). The dissent argued
that intentional viewpoint speech discrimination could be inferred from the provision's effect and
other facts. Therefore, the dissent stated that the provision must be subjected to "rigorous scru-
tiny." They concluded that the justifications advanced by PLEA and the school board were insuf-
ficient to uphold the provision under the strict scrutiny standard.
Justice Brennan hinted that he would characterize the inter-school mail system as a "limited"
public forum, a position recommended by this author. Although he thought it unnecessary to
reach this issue, he stated:
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It is arguable that the school mail system could qualify for treatment as a public forum
of some description if one focuses on whether "'the manner of expression is incompati-
ble with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.'..." It is difficult
to see how granting the respondents access to the mailboxes would be incompatible with
the normal activities of the school especially in view of the fact that the petitioner and
outside groups enjoy such access.
Id at 4172 n.7 (citations omitted).
